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Realpolitik is the claim that agreements in 
international relations are worthless since there is no 
institution to enforce them. Game theoretician Robert J. 
Aumann suggests in his 2006 Nobel lecture that “the 
fundamental insight is that repetition is like an enforcement 
mechanism.”1 The application of this insight to 
international relations allows for the improvement of their 
applicability and it, thus, refutes Realpolitik. 
Early game theory appeared as an alternative to the 
social sciences. However, it is better anchored within 
social science—as a useful tool. This renders game-
theoretical recommendations irenic. Aumann argues that 
there is no a priori reason to expect that the agreement to 
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cooperate should have practical results.2 His claim rests 
on an additional assumption: at times no improvement is 
observed. Yet, at times significant improvement is 
observed. This should encourage the search for the 
conditions that lead to improvement; it goes well with the 
proposal to consider game theory part-and-parcel of social 
science: how does playing in a given game depend on the 
culture within which it takes place. 
I. THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF GAME THEORY 
A common topic of discussion within game theory is the 
prisoner’s dilemma and its relevance to cooperation because its 
rules lead to conduct that reinforce conflict. When political 
scientists, jurists, or biologists apply game theory to the analysis of 
cooperation, they usually refer to this specific game. Of course, 
many other games pertain to cooperation. It is not easy to find out 
what game describes a situation sufficiently well in the field. It is 
easier to find out what game is advantageous to play under what 
circumstances. Such matters are better open to critical discussion 
and empirical tests. 
Before presenting the prisoner’s dilemma, let us present 
another, simpler game, the movies dilemma, a variant of the 
prisoner’s dilemma often present in film. Here it is: 
 Coop Def 
Coop 1, 1 3, 2 
Def 2, 3 2, 2 
 
 Cooperate Defect 
 
 
2 Robert J. Aumann, Nash Equilibria Are Not Self-Enforcing, in 
ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING: GAMES, ECONOMETRICS, AND 
OPTIMIZATION: CONTRIBUTIONS IN HONOUR OF JACQUES H. DRÈZEE. 
201– 206 (J.J. Gabszewicz,, J.-F. Richard, and L. Wolsey, eds. 1990). 
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Cooperate freedom, freedom penalty, reduced penalty 
Defect reduced penalty, 
penalty 
reduced penalty, reduced 
penalty 
Figure 1. The Movies Dilemma 
In this game, mutual cooperation is best for both players. To 
achieve mutual cooperation they have to trust each other 
sufficiently; if they mistrust one another, then they will come to 
mutual defection;3 one defection leads to the worst outcome. Thus, 
if both players expect the other to either cooperate or defect, then 
their very expectations will make it true.4 
In the movies dilemma, the information that one player has 
about the decision of the opponent plays a crucial role. Therefore, in 
variants of this game that allow the police to manipulate players 
through misinformation, it may lead one player to expect the other 
to defect. In that case, the expectation is self-fulfilling. Hence, 
manipulation is unnecessary. It suffices for the police to convince 
the players that the police will manage to convince one player that 
the opponent will expect the other player to expect the opponent to 
lose the trust of the one player. 
In contrast, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, it is worthwhile for 
each player to defect regardless of what the opponent does. This is 
the whole of the specification of that game. In the literature, it 
usually comes with a standard illustration that depicts a situation 
with four options: no penalty and penalties of three levels: lenient, 
severe, and medium—lenient penalty for the illegal possession of 
arms, severe penalty for having used them illegally, and the 
 
 
3 We use terms such as defection because they are common in the 
game’s theoretical literature, but not because of their moral content. For 
example, a firm that does not join a cartel defects in the game’s theoretical 
language, although it should not be denounced. 
4 This game appears in movies in diverse variants. For example, 
one prisoner may seemingly betray the other, but without losing the other’s 
trust. This variant of the game may end with the trust rewarded, and it may 
result with the trusting party alone receiving full penalty, thus, leading to a 
new game of revenge. In all variants of the movies dilemma, the information 
that one player has about the decision of the other player plays a crucial 
role. 
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reduction of the severe penalty that leaves it still harsher than the 
lenient one.5 Consider two persons detained for possession of illegal 
weapons near a bank in which an armed robbery just took place. The 
police have strong enough evidence to charge them with the lenient 
penalty, but not enough evidence to charge them with the severe 
penalty, so the police try to encourage them to testify against each 
other. To achieve this, the police isolate them and propose to each 
of them a plea-bargain. The options that the game offers are these: 
if they both defect, they will both receive medium penalty; if they 
cooperate with each other and keep silent then they will both receive 
the lenient penalty. There are four levels of possible results, from 1 
to 4: 
 Coop Def 
Coop 2, 2 4, 1 
Def 1, 4 3, 3 
Figure 2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Thus, the wish to maximize individual payoff imposes on each 
player in the prisoner’s dilemma game the betrayal of the other 
regardless of the strategy of the other.6 A strategy like the one 
 
 
5 Stuart Oskamp & Daniel Perlman, Factors Affecting 
Co- operation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, 9 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 29–31 
(1965). 
6 This idea of strategy is as old as game theory. According to the 
definition of Von Neumann and Morgenstern set forth in 1944, a strategy is 
a player’s plan, which specifies what choices to make in every possible 
situation, for all possible information available at the moment decision is 
called for. The strategy conforms to the pattern of information that the rules 
of the game prescribe. Thus, a strategy is a comprehensive policy, a plan for 
action in every possible situation that the rules of the game allow. 
Obviously, then, the project of Von Neumann and Morgenstern is utopian. 
As Kenneth Arrow has noted, such a strategy is impossible even for chess—
a problem-situation much simpler than some real-life ones. Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern postulated that comprehensive strategies are always parts 
of games. This limits the applicability of game theory to the very simplest 
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described here is not the only one available. It is dominant in the 
sense that in all permissible situations a player will gain from it more 
than from any alternative strategy; therefore, in this game a player 
cannot gain anything from the information about the opponent.7 
Hence, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, rationality precludes the 
socially optimal result: it leads to the socially worst result. This is 
why it is intriguing; the unpleasant aspect of the situation in the 
prisoner’s dilemma is that the distrust inherent in it is irreparable, 
since it imposes a result not improvable by soliciting trust.8 
In some similar games, raising the level of trust might improve 
matters. The most common illustration for this is the variant of the 
prisoner’s dilemma known as the stag-hunt game9 (what makes 
game theory interesting is that it offers many variants of this game 
with different results; a little change in the game may, at times, lead 
to a completely different result). In it, cooperation brings the best 
payoff for each of them; the unilateral betrayal of one meets the 
defector the second-best payoff and the other the worst payoff, and 
mutual betrayal gives both the third-best payoff. For this, again, four 
possible outcomes are required. This is illustrated by two hunters 
who choose simultaneously whether to hunt a stag or rabbits. They 
succeed only if they both go for a stag, and each player achieves the 
best result—the stag. A player who goes for a stag alone is met with 
absolute failure. A player who goes for a rabbit alone wins all the 
rabbits, which is the second-best result, while both going for the 
 
 
games, thus, limiting severely the intellectual challenge of game theory. 
Sometimes it is surpassingly possible to write some strategies. The standard 
examples are the always defect in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, as 
discussed above, and the tit-for-tat in the same game. See JOHN VON 
NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOR (1944) (ebook), https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/lawsc/ 
reader.action?docID=1092486&ppg=2. 
7 This is the equivalent to Savage’s “sure thing principle.” In the 
early stages of game theory, it was called “the sure thing strategy.” 
8 This may explain the futility in some situations of the good will 
of peace activists who do not try to act politically, specifically in a way that 
changes the game. 
9 Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma: 
Coordination, Game Theory and the Law, 82 S. CALIF. L. REV. 13–15 
(2008). 
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rabbits mutually gives every player half of the rabbits—the third-
best result. Therefore, it is best for both to go for the stag. For the 
one who goes for the rabbits, it is better if the other does not, namely, 
that the opponent goes for the stag (and loses), thus, enabling the 
one to hunt rabbits unimpeded. Consider then four levels of success, 
from 1 to 4: 
 Coop Def 
Coop 1, 1 4, 2 
Def 2, 4 3, 3 
Figure 3. The Stag-Hunt 
Obviously, the absence of trust prevents the achievement of the 
optimal solution in this game, while if the players trust each other 
enough, they will achieve it. The important difference between the 
two games is not in the stories, but in the matrices for it is possible 
to translate the story of the stag-hunt game to the terms of the 
prisoner’s dilemma game, and it will remain the stag-hunt game. For 
example, if the two suspects from the prisoner’s dilemma game keep 
silent, they will both walk; if they both sing, they will both receive 
the usual penalty; and if only one sings, then only that one will 
receive a lenient penalty, and the other will receive a heavy penalty. 
Hence, the matrix determines the game, not its illustration. 
The most important difference between the unrepeatable 
prisoner’s dilemma and the unrepeatable stag-hunt is that in the 
former game defection is the dominant strategy—each rational 
player will defect in any case—whereas in the latter the defection 
(or its avoidance) depends on the assessment of the interdependent 
strategies of players. Whereas the one game offers no hope for 
cooperation, the other offers recognition of the option of raising the 
incentive for cooperation by raising trust. Hence, it is more 
important to avoid situations that impose the prisoner’s dilemma 
game rather than the stag-hunt game.10 Although both games 
describe conflict situations, the lesson for social science is that in 
 
 
10 See Joseph Agassi & Abraham Meidan, Philosophy from a 
Skeptical Perspective 96 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008). 
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some conflict situations action can improve actors’ situations all 
around even without eliminating the conflict.  
The difference between variants of a game may, thus, be 
significant. The decision about which variant describes a given 
political situation already determines attitudes towards it. Thus, 
bellicose game theoreticians set the game one way, and the irenic 
ones set it the other way. This is Mario Bunge’s criticism of game 
theory: it encourages arbitrariness.11 The description of a real-life 
situation as a game will, thus, be less arbitrary if it includes 
options—whenever these are possible—for players to choose what 
game to play, with whom, and with what payoffs. This decision as 
to what game to play—this super game—describes some situations 
better than the games prescribed in standard game-theoretical 
texts.12 This requires the recognition that at times some players are 
able to choose what game to play next. 
This is also the choice available to scholars who wish to use 
game theory in order to analyze given situations: they may (and 
possibly should) ask what games are available to players and what 
game is better for a player to play. This will prescribe for scholars 
the decision as to the choice of game to analyze—the most important 
in the field. They may then help players or social planners improve 
their lots by offering good advice. For example, in the sphere of 
litigation, it is more important for students of jurisprudence to 
analyze the asymmetric litigation game than the symmetric one, even 
if the symmetric games are more frequent.13 Only the asymmetric 
 
 
11 See MARIO BUNGE, SOCIAL SCIENCE UNDER DEBATE: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 180 (Univ. of Toronto Press, 1998) (ebook), 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/southcarolina/detail.action?docID=4
671968) 
12 See id. at 176–80. 
13 For example, Weiss analyzed the appeal game as an asymmetric 
one, while Shavell analyzed the appeal game as a symmetric one. See Uri 
Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Appealability, SSRN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL 
1 (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1688877. Shavell noted that his 
model is not valid in a case of heterogeneous litigants, and, nevertheless, 
derives general policy recommendations from this model. The difference is 
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game may hide unacceptable consequences for the weaker party. 
The legal system may allow for situations in which weak litigants 
cannot realize their rights or at least it is not worthy for them. 
Legislators, judges, and attorneys for the weak litigants should try 
to prevent these situations as the initial (super) game. This is a 
worthy moral for the “law and economics” movement that aims to 
assess which legal rules are economically efficient. The analysis of 
the symmetric game—where options are the same for each side—is 
elegant, easy, natural, and relatively easy to apply, but it is not the 
most important game in town. Legal theory will benefit more from 
research that will reduce the number of unavoidable injustices of the 
system, and these are the asymmetric cases where financially 
comfortable litigants have many more options, including those who 
are less risk-averse due to their richness than ones who happen to be 
financially constrained.14 This may lead the weak parties to forego 
the use of all the legal advantages that they have and settle for much 
less than what the law entitles them. This is also the case when one 
party is a one-time player, and the other party is a repeat player15 
(ironically, the literature considers this case not a part of “law and 
economics” but a part of “law and society”; obviously, it is both). 
Any move intended to compensate the less well-off litigant is a 
revision that will lead jurists to prevent games that end up in patent 
injustice. This is not limited to any specific society; the Bible 
mentions asymmetric litigation: “seek judgment, relieve the 
oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow.”16 
Admittedly, asymmetric games are usually mathematically less 
elegant, but they are socially more important, at least from the 
humanist perspective. Unlike the prisoner’s dilemma, many 
situations of war and peace comprise asymmetric games. In many 
 
 
not only that one analyzes this game and the other analyzes another game: 
the important question is what game should be analyzed in the theory of 
litigation. What game should we see when we recommend rules of 
litigation? See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process and Adjudicator 
Incentives, 35 THE J. OF LEGAL STUDIES. 1, (2006). 
14 See Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty, TEL 
AVIV UNIV. L. FAC. PAPERS, 2005, at 1. 
15 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
16 Isaiah 1:17. 
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cases of violence, the strong party sees the game as asymmetric but 
presents it as symmetric in efforts to fend off the police, the courts, 
or public opinion. Even kids who are bullies in school do that when 
facing school authorities. Under attack, then, it is often useful to 
change the game by making a credible threat to involve the police, 
the courts, and public opinion. Making a conflict visible may even 
render an asymmetric game symmetric and thereby reduce violence 
dramatically.  
II. A COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR APPROACH AND THE 
RELATED LITERATURE 
Aumann (2009) claims: 
incentive . . . has to be there, and that is what is represented 
by the prisoner’s dilemma in very stark, obvious language 
. . . . Absolutely, you must create incentives for stopping 
CO2. There is one very simple way to do it. Just tax the 
emissions. You could impose a much higher tax on 
gasoline. And there are other ways to tax emissions. Do not 
overtax them, but tax them at the true cost of these 
emissions. Absolutely, you have to give incentives. Not by 
fear: that is not going to work. What is going to work is 
giving people incentives. Precisely game engineering.17 
We assume our readers are familiar with this, especially since 
incentives can appear in different places and grow at different paces 
depending on extant social and political conditions. Incentives can 
be chosen as part of the game, such as in the case that a player 
chooses a conditional strategy in the prisoner's dilemma, and they 
can be chosen in order to prevent a particular kind of games. Let us 
sharpen that in the example Aumann described, the social planner 
actually supplies an incentive in order to prevent an undesirable 
game, so it is actually a super-game. 
Similarly, Aumann and Shapley show the need for social 
science in order to explain the stability of the repeated prisoner’s 
 
 
17 Robert J. Aumann, Game Engineering, in DISCUSSION PAPER: 
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RATIONALITY no. 518 (2009). 
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dilemma—as due to the cooperation between players imposed by 
the rule that requires penalty for those who do not punish:  
it . . . should be noted . . . that not only are defections from 
the cooperative sequence punished, but also defections 
from any punishing sequence are punished. A player who 
‘should’ punish and does not do so will himself be 
punished. This is what provides the motivation for the 
punisher actually to carry out the penalty, and so keeps [the 
equilibrium].18 
To this we add its converse: the same rules can destabilize the 
prisoner’s dilemma itself and even eliminate it almost totally. 
As to the context of any game, Aumann and Drèzee (2008) 
observe this: 
Formally, a game is defined by its strategy sets and payoff 
functions. But in real life, many other parameters are 
relevant; there is a lot more going on. Situations that 
substantively are vastly different may nevertheless 
correspond to precisely the same strategic game. For 
example, in a parliamentary democracy with three parties, 
the winning coalitions are the same whether the parties 
each hold a third of the seats in parliament, or, say, 49 
percent, 39 percent, and 12 percent, respectively. But the 
political situations are quite different. The difference lies 
in the attitudes of the players; in their expectations about 
each other; in custom; and in history, though the rules of 
the game do not distinguish between the two situations.19 
Let us comment on this: in Aumann’s example (or even in a 
more extremist case of seats divided to 49%, 49%, 2%), traditional 
game theory may deem the three political parties in possession of 
 
 
18 Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, Long-Term 
Competition—A Game-Theoretic Analysis, in ESSAYS IN GAME THEORY, 
1– 15 (Megiddo N. ed., 1994). 
19 Robert J. Aumann & Jacques H. Drèzee, Rational Expectations 
in Games, 98 AM. ECON REV. 1, 72–86 (2008). 
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equal power, since no party can establish a winning coalition by 
itself, and each party can establish a winning coalition with every 
other party.20 Clearly, this is a mistake. Nevertheless, game theory 
is right in considering the small party in this case as having much 
more power than the number of its seats suggest and in its 
explanation of this fact; but, game theory ignores the constraint on 
the power of the small party that social norms of fairness impose. 
Game theory also ignores the incentives that this situation provides 
to change the situation radically. Thus, members of the big parties 
may defect and establish small parties or the majority may change 
the voting system. This invites interesting questions. How does the 
prevalent view of fairness influence the situation? What is the right 
view of fairness? How should it influence the situation? These 
questions and their likes pull us out of the mathematical world of 
game theory and lead us to apply social science. This illustrates the 
fruitfulness of traditional game theory as well as its limitation. 
Hence, to be fruitful, game theory should become part and parcel of 
social science. Otherwise, game theory may generate more mistakes 
than it can prevent. 
In the conclusion of their paper, Aumann and Drèzee add this: 
“The fundamental object of study in game theory should be the game 
situation G rather than its underlying game G,” while in the paper 
itself they define game situation as “a game played in a specific 
context.”21 
As young as game theory is, it already has a tradition. That 
tradition rests on its initial aim that was tacit. It was, we say, to 
replace the explanatory model of the social sciences (indeed, one of 
the early names of game theory was “social physics”). Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern said of its applications that they are of 
two kinds: “On the one hand to games in the proper sense, on the 
other hand to economic and sociological problems as well . . . . We 
hope to establish satisfactorily . . . that the typical problems of 
economic behavior become strictly identical with the mathematical 
notions of suitable games of strategy . . . .” For economic and social 
problems, the games fulfill—or should fulfill—the same function, 
 
 
20 See id. 
21 Id. at 72, 82. 
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which various geometrical-mathematical models have successfully 
performed in the physical sciences.22 
The 2008 paper of Aumann and Drèzee just cited is possibly a 
challenge to the tradition of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, a step-
in effort to revise it. In line with this we try to anchor the theory—
as is or in a revised version—within traditional social science. To 
that end, we draw attention to the difference between Aumann23 
(1990) and Aumann and Drèzee (2008). Aumann (1990) claimed—
quite rightly—that agreement to play the stag-hunt game in mutual 
cooperation is not self-enforcing.24 He added that the agreement to 
cooperate while playing the stag-hunt game does not bring about any 
improvement.25 This we deem somewhat incorrect since it is an 
oversight of the agreement that may change the mutual expectations 
of players that the result of the game depends on. Aumann’s 
argument is this: both players will gladly agree to cooperate, 
whether or not they later keep their word while playing; hence, their 
explicit agreement conveys no information: “To say that a game is 
non-cooperative means that there is no external mechanism 
available for the enforcement of agreements . . . . Incentives can be 
changed by changing either the payoffs or the information of the 
players.”26 
Of course, one may see the custom of keeping promises as 
irrational in any one-time game. This is a mistake. Expectations 
regarding cooperation that rest on agreement are too common to 
dismiss. Also, it will be beneficial for any specific society as well as 
for the international community to reform the culture in a manner 
that generates expectations to cooperate. That reform would render 
the reliance on promises eminently rational. As such, agreements 
tend to raise expectations; they improve the likelihood of achieving 
cooperation even in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. This has 
a significant effect also for international relations, where institution 
to enforce contracts are still rather ineffective. This is in agreement 
with Aumann: “In the international relations literature, the game has 
 
 
22 VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 6, at 2. 
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been called the ‘security dilemma.’”27 Contrary to Aumann 1990, 
however, we argue that international agreements in stag-hunt 
situations improve the disposition to cooperate and that, therefore, 
game theory rejects Realpolitik in international relations 
(Realpolitik, to repeat, is the recommendation to consider all 
agreements altogether worthless28). 
Aumann is quite right in asserting that there is no a priori reason 
to expect agreement to cooperate to lead to cooperation.29 The very 
need to come to agreement may already signal potential mistrust 
and, thus, mistrust and doubt as to the expectation that promises lead 
to cooperation. Thus, Aumann’s assertion that there is no a priori 
reason to expect agreement to lead to cooperation requires 
completion; at times, but only at times, there is a posteriori reason 
for that.30 This then is an argument for the proposal to consider game 
theory, part and parcel, of social science. How a given player will 
behave in a given game, thus, depends on the culture within which 
the game takes place. Hence, the conclusion from the rules of the 
game to the conduct of its players depends on tacit suppositions that 
represent the social conditions under which they play the game. 
These are better specified explicitly. The rules of the game called 
game theory should be altered to include this demand. This will lead 
to the proliferation of variants of many games that have, thus far, 
already been considered exhaustively. 
For example, in the traditional wording of the stag-hunt game, 
the description of the set of alternatives is too sketchy: the option of 
agreement is missing without notice. Therefore, when one mentions 
it, one implicitly indicates that the game is not a closed system; it is, 
then, not mathematics; at best, it is social science. Considered pure 
mathematics, it does not have a unique solution: the conclusion that 
agreement will lead to improvement is questionable and depends on 





28 Aumann, supra note 2. 
29 Aumann, supra note 2, at 619–20. 
30 See id. 
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We can conclude from the above discussion that it is better to 
play the variant of stag-hunt with the option of preliminary 
communication than the stag-hunt without the option, and that these 
are indeed two different games. In the stag-hunt game with an option 
of preliminary communication, words are not merely cheap talk, but, 
they are in the one-time prisoner’s dilemma game with an option of 
preliminary communication. To be precise, we should not ignore the 
variant of prisoner’s dilemma played publicly with unenforceable 
agreements to cooperate: in this variant of the game, players will 
respect their agreement to cooperate in cultures in which the refusal 
to honor one’s commitment will damage one’s reputation 
considerably.  
In Aumann’s Nobel lecture we read, “the fundamental insight 
is that repetition is like an enforcement mechanism.”31 This insight 
of Aumann is a clear refutation of Realpolitik that assumes that since 
there is no institution to enforce agreements in international 
relations, those agreements are worthless. Aumann’s insight 
explains why covenants without sword waving can serve as much 
more than mere words: they add significant strength to much needed 
security. What we said contradicts Watkins assertion,32 which states 
that game theory endorses the claim of Hobbes: “covenants, without 
the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.” 
We argue that game theory leads to the contrary conclusion: that 
covenants may prevent war even without sword waving, more in 
line with the observation of Hobbes.33 
 
 
31 Aumann, supra note 1, at 354. 
32 John Watkins, Imperfect Rationality, in EXPLANATION IN THE 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 202–03 (Robert Borger and Frank Cioffi ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1970). 
33 THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW NATURAL AND POLITIC 
78 (Ferdinand Tonnies ed., Frank Cass and Company Limited 1969): “In 
contracts that consist of such mutual trust, as that nothing be by either party 
performed for the present, when the contract is between such as are not 
compellable, he that performeth first, considering the disposition of men to 
take advantage of everything for their benefit, doth but betray himself 
thereby to the covetousness, or other passion of him with whom he 
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Game theory conflicts with the Realpolitik idea that 
international agreements are not worth the paper on which they are 
written.34 Game theory similarly conflicts with the Realpolitik idea 
that the rule of law does not matter since it can do no more than 
reflect and legitimize extant balances of forces active between the 
nations with no ability to change them.35 This is the social 
philosophy of Hegel that is popular today among the legal realist 
movement.36 Fortunately, this view meets with a very simple 
refutation: a new enforceable law can prevent, or at least reduce, 
situations of prisoner’s dilemma, which is agreeable to all parties 
involved, so such a law has a great likelihood of changing an 
undesirable Nash equilibrium in many games.37 
III. ADDITIONAL MORALS TO LEARN FROM AUMANN’S 
NOBEL LECTURE (2005) 
We offer two morals from Aumann’s Nobel lecture. The first 
corresponds with his conclusion of his analysis of a particular 
repeated game:  
 
 
contracteth. And therefore such covenants are of none effect. For there is no 
reason why the one should perform first, if the other be likely not to perform 
afterward. And whether he be likely or not, he that doubteth, shall be judge 
himself . . . . But when there shall be such power coercive over both the 
parties, as shall deprive them of their private judgments in this point; then 
may such covenants be effectual; seeing he that performeth first shall have 
no reasonable cause to doubt of the performance of the other that may be 
compelled thereunto.” 
34 See Erik Ringmar, The Relevance of International Law: a 
Hegelian Interpretation of a Peculiar Seventeenth-Century Preoccupation, 
21 REV. OF INT’L STUDIES 87 n.1 (1995). 
35 Id. at 91. 
36 See id. at 101–02. 
37 A game is in a Nash equilibrium only if no player has incentive 
to change strategy unilaterally. See John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games., 
54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS S2 n.2, 286 (1951). 
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“What is maintaining the equilibrium in these games is the 
threat of punishment. If you like, call it ‘MAD’—mutually 
assured destruction, the motto of the cold war.”38 
In the game, he analyzed it is indeed feasible to implement the 
advice to punish the party that plays the repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
with a hostile strategy. It may nevertheless be infeasible in 
international relations, for example, in cases where punishment 
leads to a response from a third player such as an umpire (it will not 
be a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, but a mere variant of it). In an 
effort to achieve a result of cooperation in the game, a player may 
be ready to punish the opponent severely. Other parties may then 
block the whole game, even in cases in which mutual cooperation is 
achievable with relative ease. Even the option of lenient penalty may 
be politically and scarcely feasible then. Therefore, an umpire may 
prevent the game and sometimes lead one player to always 
cooperate and the other to always defect. Let us propose these two 
games that may be enforced by the umpire: a repeated unilateral 
stag-hunt and a repeated unilateral prisoner’s dilemma. Therefore, it 
is a super game; the umpire may force the states to play one of these 
games; in other situations, the teacher may force the pupils to play 
one of these games. In these games, one player can choose between 
cooperation and defection, and the second player has only an option 
of cooperation. The payoffs of the possible results of these games 
are such that the payoffs of these results in the prisoners’ dilemma 
or stag-hunt. Actually, the umpire deletes one of the lines in the 
matrix of the game and by this makes it a new matrix—a new game. 
This will be the matrix of the unilateral prisoner’s dilemma: 
 Coop Def 
Coop 1, 2 2, 1 
Figure 4. The Unilateral Prisoner’s Dilemma 
This will be the matrix of the unilateral stag-hunt: 
 Coop Def 
 
 
38 Aumann, supra note 1, at 354. 
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Coop 1, 1 2, 2 
Figure 5. The Unilateral Stag-Hunt 
One of the advantages of the variant of a repeated stag-hunt 
with an umpire whose task is to force one player to avoid punishing 
the other player, to enforce the repeated unilateral stag-hunt, on such 
a variant of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, is this: in the repeated 
unilateral stag-hunt, the players will reach mutual cooperation, 
while in the repeated unilateral prisoner’s dilemma they will reach 
the result in which one player will always defect and the other will 
always cooperate. While mutual cooperation is a possible result (as 
well as mutual defection) in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the 
only possible result in the repeated unilateral prisoner’s dilemma is 
that one player will always defect (this is their dominant strategy) 
and the other player will always cooperate. Hence, international 
intervention will be more desirable if it prevents the repeated 
prisoners’ dilemma than if it prevents one side unilaterally from 
defecting in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Furthermore, if a state 
believes that the umpire prevents them from defecting in a repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma, the state should prevent this game when 
possible.  
Notice that although in a prisoner’s dilemma game the response 
to always-defect by always-defecting is reasonable and is possibly 
the best winning strategy, it still poses a possible penalty. Similarly, 
raising the reward for mutual cooperation or for being betrayed 
unilaterally may make tit-for-tat the reasonable strategy even in the 
prisoner’s dilemma. This is so since the risk of the tit-for-tat strategy 
that incurs is reasonable: a player who adopts it takes a risk of losing 
in the first round, but he gains the opportunity to achieve the payoff 
of mutual cooperation, an opportunity that is not achievable by the 
always-defect strategy. The rational choice between these two 
options then depends, not only on the expectation that the opponent 
will play tit-for-tat, but also on the time discount and on the distance 
between the different payoffs (this fully accords with the complaint 
of Bunge 1998 that game theoreticians do not consider sufficiently 
critically the numbers that they write as examples for payoffs).39 
 
 
39 BUNGE, supra note 11, at 178. 
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The second moral from Aumann’s theory is sober. The mutual 
cooperation in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma depends on mutual 
threat, sometimes a threat to use force or to punish. Therefore, a 
change of the rules of the game that stabilizes mutual cooperation is 
beneficial even when its players choose mutual cooperation as the 
status quo. This is a challenge to the observation of Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern that any “game is simply the totality of the rules 
which describes it”: they obviously overlooked the possibility of 
changing the rules of a game.40 Constitutions often include some 
formal rules for change, and every constitution is open to a 
revolution.41 This is so since even if the players achieve a Nash 
equilibrium of cooperation; the equilibrium may not be stable for 
some changes. Furthermore, there are equilibria of cooperation that 
rest on mutual threats, and there are those that rest on mutual trust; 
from a social science point of view, the latter is more stable and, 
thus, more desirable.  
A physical system is in an equilibrium when the net force on 
each body in it is zero. It is stable if a small temporary deviation 
from it does not destroy it. It is unstable if it does (the equilibrium 
is indifferent if this deviation leads to another equilibrium). 
Moreover, equilibrium is relative to the forces in question: a system 
can be stable regarding only one set of extant forces. A game is in a 
Nash equilibrium if, and only if, no player has incentive to change 
strategy unilaterally. However, not all Nash equilibria are stable. 
Consider not only strategy change but also changes in the rules. 
Some equilibria remain stable even after such a change, but not after 
a change in the mutual expectations. Thus, stability is a relative 
matter. 
One great advantage of the repeated stag-hunt game over the 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game is that only in the repeated stag-
hunt game does each player always mutually cooperate, resulting in 
a Nash equilibrium. Thus, pacifist players will gain most from 
preferring to play stag-hunt over playing prisoner’s dilemma: a 
 
 
40 VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 6, at 49.  
41 See generally Herbert John Spiro, Constitution, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/constitution-
politics-and-law. 
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player committed to play “always cooperate” will achieve the best 
result in all interactions, even where the received norm is mutual 
defection. And then, remarkably, all parties to the game are better 
off when they move from an equilibrium of mutual cooperation in 
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game to an equilibrium of mutual 
cooperation in a repeated stag-hunt game.  
One may question this observation by noticing that those two 
equilibria allot the same payoffs to both players: this suggests there 
is no advantage in the shift from the one game to the other. The 
preference of more stable equilibria over less stable ones will lead 
to the rejection of this suggestion. This generally holds true as long 
as the more stable equilibrium does not impose stagnation; 
otherwise, the objection to stagnation may change the preference. 
Game theory is understandably an idealization, and, thus, it is not 
sufficiently sensitive to account for the difference in degrees of 
stability of the repeated game; this is no reason to overlook this 
difference, however. It is generally a political mistake to overlook 
degrees of stability, and it seems game theory can hardly help here 
without first inviting some development or change. As it happens, 
this oversight is common. Politicians systematically propose to end 
a war by reinstating the status quo in hopes of avoiding the repetition 
of past failed efforts at stability. At times, this hope for better 
stability rests on better considerations of the balance of powers 
between warring states. Game theory in its current state is unable to 
critically examine such considerations, as it is not sensitive enough 
to compare degrees of stability. It even overlooks the price for the 
achievement and maintenance of mutual cooperation in games of the 
prisoner’s dilemma. Parties to this sort of game may make 
aggressive threats, which are costly even when there is no intention 
to follow them up. And then, players have to weigh the cost of war 
against the cost of the equilibrium within which peace depends on 
the fragile tool of threats to fight back (this resembles the 
equilibrium of peace in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma). Since the 
consideration of waging war is expensive, it is wiser, whenever 
possible, to change the situation to enable players to rely on trust, 
which is the transition from the prisoner’s dilemma game to the stag-
hunt game. This happened in Europe after World War II, it seems. 
For now, peace is recognized as the best option for every European 
Union country, even where an attack on a neighbor would lead to an 
immediate surrender. This situation is obviously the best goal for all 
international relations, as it achieves the most stable situation. In this 
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situation, the peace will be stable, even if the two sides assess the 
outcome of a potential war as advantageous for themselves (even to 
the degree they are both convinced that they will definitively win 
the war). This is quite intriguing because in most other sorts of 
games this optimistic assessment of the results of wars usually leads 
to wars. Game theory, to repeat, does not succeed in accounting for 
the stability of the kind of game that leads to a Nash equilibrium of 
peace since no degree of stability is intentionally built as yet into the 
system of game theory.  
We therefore recommend rendering game theory more sensitive 
to degrees of stability of its equilibria. This includes stability of the 
equilibrium when the rules are unstable or when players are 
misinformed, commit common mistakes, or change their 
preferences midgame.42 It also includes stability of the equilibrium 
when new players enter the game or when the available set of 
alternatives for current players change. The development should be 
more fruitful as a toolbox to achieve stable world peace.43 The ideal 
 
 
42 Howard et al. discuss a meta-game for which prospective players 
may choose their emotions, preferences, and even rationality. Players’ self-
interest will influence these and make some of their threats and promises 
credible; they will then rationally promote their chosen preferences. 
Howard et al. say, “often (as a player) one would be better placed 
strategically if one’s preferences (P) were replaced by other preferences 
(P’). With preferences P’, one would be in a stronger position to pursue 
one’s original preferences P. Fundamentally, this happens because players 
can make use of each other’s preferences as a means to obtain their ends.” 
Now, if in the former game the players can adopt such moves, they do not 
improve their situation in the central game but prevent the central game; 
they make it another game. This is so since objective rules and options do 
not suffice to determine the game, as payoff for players signify too. Oddly, 
Howard et al. dismiss this rather obvious consideration. Nigel Howard ET 
AL., Manifesto for a Theory of Drama and Irrational Choice, 44 J. 
OPERATIONAL RES. SOC’Y, Jan. 1993, at 99, 100. See also, Nigel Howard, 
The Present and Future of Metagame Analysis, EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 
32.1, 1987, at 1. 
43 There are different sorts of equilibria in game theory, and they 
may be perceived to present different degrees of stability, but not in a way 
that will be fruitful for handling the problems we present here. We invite 
our readers to challenge us and correct our mistakes; we will be grateful for 
this. 
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of international relations would naturally be a solution of this kind, 
whenever possible. The hope, that we suggest will make it more 
viable, is that this situation is achievable by building widespread 
expectations for the application in international courts of strict laws 
against aggressive national leaders. At the very least, we should 
welcome efforts to minimize all incentives for political leaders to 
break international law or to ignore its summons or rulings. All this 
is easier said than done, of course. Our point, however, is that it is 
common sense and obvious from the viewpoint of game theory, as 
it should be. The generally received observation is that no one wants 
game theory to make recommendations that conflict with the public 
interest. And it is almost a consensus that the public interest is to 
make peace a top priority in all cases except for intolerable situations 
like enslavement or destabilization that worsens the situation (as 
symbolized by the compromise that Britain accepted in Munich in 
1938).44 If there is a situation in which war is better than peace, this 
should be subject to critical discussion, together with all possible 
answers to the question, what compromise is tolerable. Can game 
theory in its current version help the search for a reasonable answer 
to such a discussion? The answer, it seems on its face, is present-
day game theory is useless for that purpose. We have argued that 
this is not true: present-day game theory may help rethink how to 
mitigate situations that threaten peace, admittedly, when degrees of 
stability signify greatly this is the case. And then, we say, it need not 
be so since game theory can nevertheless help one rethink the extent 
of the desirability of raising the degree of stability of peace and, 
thus, the cost that it is worthwhile to meet that end. And, observe, 
 
 
44 See, Munich Agreement, Fr.-Ger.-Gr. Brit.-It., Sept. 29, 1938, The 
Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School. 
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Abraham Wald has shown the way.45 Considering chains of games 
and sub-games will be a useful extension of current game theory.46 
We suggest then that the most significant achievement of game 
theory is not in the design or in the applications of games, but in the 
suggestions of what games are unwise to play. Here, we follow 
Popper (Popper 1945), who said, politically, preventing pain or 
suffering has priority over creating pleasure. Obviously, in game 
theory, prevention is also much easier than application because 
every game requires some conditions for its very applicability, and 
these are never too clear and are seldom part of game theory proper. 
The games we consider unwise to play are obviously dangerous, as 
they may lead to war. The paradigm case here is 
chicken/brinkmanship. To our regret, game theoreticians are often 
more concerned with the best way to play them. Even if they are 
right, we prefer not to join them, but to recommend the proposal to 
avoid playing them when possible. At times, the game theoreticians 
in question stress that peaceful games fit some utopian situations so 
that in the meantime war is inevitable. We say, even if some war is 
inevitable, we should do our best to try to prevent every specific case 
of impending war, giving the good Lord the benefit of the doubt.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Here then is our major corollary to game theory: the tools for 
achieving cooperation are incentives that generate strong and 
significant expectations: in brief, hope. The incentives may be 
 
 
45 See Abraham Wald, Statistical Decision Functions Which 
Minimize the Maximum Risk, Annals of Mathematics, 46 ANNALS 
MATHEMATICS, Second Series, Apr. 1945, at 265. See also Abraham Wald, 
Statistical Decision Functions (1950). See also Jacob Wolfowitz, J 1952. 
Abraham Wald, 1902–1950, The ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 
23, 1–13 (1952). 
46 See Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, Quitting Games, 26 
MATHEMATICS OPERATIONS RES., May 2001, at 265. Solan and Vieille 
discuss the system in which players have the choice between quitting and 
continuing to play. They impose on games limitations that increase their 
mathematical elegance. Alas, these limitations lose the empirical character 
of games that gamblers play and of games that are important in social 
studies. 
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supplied by the legal system and by the norms and customs of civil 
society. The expectations may be products of institutions created to 
raise trust and join the educational or the diplomatic system. 
Surprisingly, a little success in trust-building may have a huge, 
dramatic, and positive impact on situations like the repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma. Is this moral from game theory true? This is an 
empirical question not discussed here. That it deserves such 
discussions is obvious from the huge success of every educator who 
tried to reach neglected youths. Still, it is important to notice that the 
theory suggests that trust is superior to defection as the default 
option, thus, opening a venue to its empirical tests.  
We recommend adding hope to the incentives and expectations 
of standard economic theory. Of course, appropriate incentives may 
generate hope, but they may also generate despair—intentionally or 
not. People can expect the best (that sounds hopeful), and they can 
expect the worst. Yet the logic of the ascription of expectations to 
rational agents differs from that of hope, since, unlike expectation 
theory, the theory of hope requires the will to live as more basic than 
any expectation, rational or not. As it happens, game theory evolved 
during the Cold War under the strong influence of economic theory 
and expectations theory. The theory of hope awaits proper 
development. We suggest that this step will also promote peace. 
